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The Democratic Impact of Traditional Cultural Values in Africa and Asia: 
The Cases of South Korea and South Africa 
 
 
Introduction 
Traditional cultural values have long been seen by scholars as a significant obstacle to political and 
economic development in the post colonial world, especially in Africa and Asia.  Publics which prioritize 
things like the collective good of the family and community over procedure and individual rights, grant 
uncritical respect to authority and social hierarchy, and identify themselves primarily as members of sub-
national kinship groups rather than modern nation-states, are said to be particularly inhospitable places for 
representative democracies and market economies to take root. 
 
The theory of political culture argues that these traditional values result from long standing norms, 
orientations and values embedded in ethnic cultures and transmitted to succeeding generations through 
socialization.  They are expected to shape how individuals in those countries subsequently think, prefer 
and act, and thus have important influences on, among other things, a country’s choice of economic and 
political regime (e.g., Almond and Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1997; and Inglehart, 1988).  Modernization 
theorists accepted these premises and advocated policies that would bring about things like rapid 
urbanization, industrialization, increases in formal education, and growth of middle classes that would – 
among other things -- either change individual values over the course of a lifetime, or produce new 
generations with less traditional and more modern outlooks on life, economics and politics. 
 
Until recently, however, such theses have been hard to test in any systematic way because they require 
cross-national data about individual and collective value structures in the developing world.  Beginning in 
the 1990s, however, cross-national survey projects have emerged that focus on the processes of political 
and economic reform in the developing world, including the Latinobarometro, the Afrobarometer, the 
New Europe Barometer, and, most recently, the East Asia Barometer.  The findings of these surveys have 
enabled important cross-national comparisons within continents (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998; 
Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; Dalton and Ong, 2004; Shin and Chu, 2005; Mattes and 
Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).i  While the Barometer projects have been working toward greater standardization 
of question items, problems of data incomparability and data availability have thus far precluded 
extensive cross-continental analysis (but see Rose, et. al, 2005). 
 
In this article we take a tentative first step towards such broad gauged comparison using data from one 
country from the East Asia Barometer (South Korea, 2003) and one from the Afrobarometer (South 
Africa, 2002) to address the following questions.  To what degree have each of these projects developed 
reliable and valid measures of traditional values specific to their respective cultures?  How widely are 
these values held across these mass publics?  And to what extent do traditional values really preclude the 
development of public support for democracy? 
 
To date, these questions have rarely been examined in a systematic manner using empirical data, though 
the results from a couple of recent studies that analyze Asian data find are mixed.  We extend these 
analyses by, most obviously, drawing African data into the analysis, but also by pursuing different 
strategies for developing composite measures of both traditional values and attitudes to democracy.  In 
addition, we also compare the impact of traditional values on attitudes to democracy with the effects of 
other theoretically derived factors such as institutional influences, performance evaluations, cognitive 
awareness, and social structure. 
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Comparing South Africa and South Korea? 
To be frank, part of this study is motivated by the unique presence of African and Asian data available to 
the respective co-authors.  But are South Africa and South Korea the best places to test arguments about 
traditional values and democracy?  Both were once characterized by extensive agrarian production and 
traditional culture.  Both were once occupied and colonized by foreign powers.  But both went through 
relatively rapid transitions to at least partially industrialized economies in the mid 20th century, with South 
Africa enjoying rapid economic growth that was both state- and market-driven in the 1960s, and South 
Korea in the 1970s and 1980s.  Thus both are now the most developed countries on their respective 
(mainland) continents.  At the same time, both countries are widely seen as the most successful examples 
of “Third Wave” democratization in Africa and Asia. 
 
If modernization theory is correct, their relatively advanced level of development would mean that 
citizens in both countries are less likely to possess traditional values than their less developed neighbors.  
Yet precisely because these publics might be more evenly divided between traditional and modern value 
positions than their less developed neighbors, they might offer particularly useful places to test for the 
supposed differences between traditionalists and modernists in terms of attitudes about democracy. 
 
Indeed, both countries seem to be experiencing similar problems with their new democracies.  While both 
receive Freedom House ratings that enable them to be classified as “liberal democracies,” neither can yet 
be characterized as consolidated (Im, 2004; Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005).  Both societies exhibit 
heavily cleaved electoral systems in which deep social cleavages are manifested in politicized voting 
behavior, by region in South Korea, and by race in South Africa.  Both also have under-developed party 
systems.  In South Korea’s case, parties are personal vehicles of presidential candidates, while in South 
Africa, opposition parties have few resources and are unable to project themselves as credible national 
projects.  Official corruption is a major issue in both countries, including right up to high executive 
offices (for example, the personal confidante and financier of South Africa’s Deputy President, Jacob 
Zuma, is currently on trial for, among other things, arranging a bribe from a French arms manufacturer to 
Zuma).  In 2002, South Korea ranked as the 40th most corrupt country, and South Africa as 36th, in the 
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index.  And both countries have been characterized as 
“delegative democracies,” with presidents who prefer to centralize as much decision-making authority as 
possible in the executive branch, while marginalizing political parties and legislatures, in effect acting as 
though all power had been delegated to them through the election (Im, 2004; Croissant, 2004; Mattes and 
Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). 
 
 
Conceptualizing and Measuring Asian Values 
In the Asian context, traditional values have usually been referred to as “Asian” values.  Yet as Park and 
Shin (2004; 2) point out, the religious diversity of Asia means that when most analysts speak about Asian 
values, they really mean Confucian values. 
 
In contrast to Western culture, which sees society ultimately as an aggregation of rights-bearing 
individuals, traditional Asian value structures proceed from the premise of an organic society in which all 
individuals are inherently and fundamentally inter-connected (Marsella, De Vos and Hsu, 1985; Fiske, et 
al., 1998).  The interests of the group or community take primacy over those of the individual.  More than 
rights, individuals first carry duties and obligations toward the family, elders and other social leaders and 
they are expected to respect social hierarchies.  Individual behavior ought to be guided by the perceived 
virtues of maintaining harmonious relations with others, hard work, thrift and education.  Leaders gain 
legitimacy by virtue of their position in the social hierarchy, rather than their individual qualities.  In turn, 
paternalistic leaders (in both the family and the state) will look out for the best interests of society (Pye, 
1985; Scalapino, 1989; Lau and Kuan, 1988; Yang, 1988; Rozman, 1991; Huntington, 1996; Dalton and 
Ong, 2004; Park and Shin, 2004).   
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Scholars have argued that such values may compete with or preclude the development of other values that 
are often seen to be necessary in a democratic society, such as individualism, tolerance of dissent, and 
interpersonal trust (Pye, 1985; Fukuyama, 1995).  Or, more minimally, people who value such things may 
be less likely to prefer democracy as a political regime.  Indeed, Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew is only the 
latest Asian autocrat to rationalize authoritarian government with such cultural logic (Zakaria, 1994). 
 
But, as noted above, these arguments – both that these societies exhibit the traditional values described, 
and that they have a negative impact on democratization – have rarely been put to systematic empirical 
test.  Two initial probes have turned up mixed results.  Using data from the 1995-1998 and 2000-2002 
World Values Surveys in seven East Asian countries (South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, Singapore), Dalton and Ong (2004) developed indices of authority orientations toward the 
family and other elements of society.ii  They found wide variation in overall agreement with some items 
amongst these seven countries.  They also found that aggregate agreement with some orientations in Asia 
were no different from those for four “control” Pacific-rim western democracies (the United States, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand).  Most importantly, they found extremely weak and often 
insignificant relationships within each country between respondents’ authority orientations and their 
positions on a “democratic regime index.”iii  Indeed, they found generally stronger, though at best modest, 
relationships amongst the western countries. 
 
The second attempt comes from an analysis of South Korean data generated by the East Asia Barometer, 
a project that sees one of its main goals as “examin[ing] the extent to which traditional values inherited by 
East Asian societies constrain the acquisition of democratic values and shape the patterns of civic 
attitudes” (Chu, 2003: 8).  Park and Shin (2004) lay out what they regard to be four important dimensions 
of Asian social values (social hierarchy, social harmony, group primacy and anti-pluralism) and three 
dimensions of Asian political values (family-state, moral state, anti-adversarial politicsiv).  They then 
identify two question items that they believe tap each item and form a construct measure of each.  
Correlating each value construct with separate indices of Democratic Supportv and Authoritarian 
Rejection,vi they found weak relationships between both social and political values and Democratic 
Support, but modest relationships between some social values and all political values and Authoritarian 
Rejection.  When taken together, these social and political values explained less than 2 percent of the 
variance in Democratic Support, but 11 percent of the variance in Authoritarian Rejection. 
 
Taking note of Park and Shin’s conceptual framework of seven separate social and political values, we 
wanted to test whether it was possible to develop a smaller, more parsimonious number of broader value 
dimensions.  And since ordinary respondents often hear different things when asked a set of questions 
than what might have been intended by the survey designer, we also tested whether popular responses to 
these items actually fell into the patterns anticipated by the Park and Shin framework. 
 
Using Factor Analysis and Reliability Analysis, we find that it is possible to build broader constructs of 
social values.  Rather than the seven two-item value constructs employed by Park and Shin, we identify 
four broad value indices that we interpret as measuring: 1) Respect for Authority; 2) Accommodation  / 
Communalism; 3) Emphasis on Social Harmony; and 4) Respect for Family / Elders.  In addition, four 
other individual items in the East Asia Barometer that tap potentially important aspects of traditional 
values fail to correlate sufficiently with any of the four indices, or with each other, and thus are retained 
as single-item indicators.  On their face, we interpret these to measure: 1) Patriarchy; 2) Fatalism; 3) 
Educational Elitism; and 4) Interpersonal Trust (the traditional response would actually be distrust). 
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While the eight question items displayed in Table 1, part 1.1, obtain sufficiently similar patterns of 
responses to allow us to treat them as a measure of a single underlying value dimension that we interpret 
as Respect for Authority, the item results also demonstrate that the average (median) South Korean 
“disagrees” with all but one item.  The only exception is on the issue of whether leaders with majority 
support should disregard the views of the minority, a question on which South Koreans are evenly divided 
(50 percent agree, 50 percent disagree).  In general, between 20 and 40 percent “agree” with the 
traditionalist position, and at most 5 percent “strongly agree.”  Thus, even if it was once accurate to 
characterize South Koreans as acquiescent to political authority, it is no longer so. 
 
And the average South Korean disagrees with most statements relating to political and individual steps to 
maintain societal harmony that come at the expense of the individual, and with a series of statements 
about traditional respect for family and elders.  Majorities also reject the individual (non-indexed) 
statements that men lose face by working for women (Patriarchy), that wealth and poverty are determined 
by fate (Fatalism), and that the better educated should have more say politically (Educational Elitism).  
Only on the scale measuring Accommodation / Communalism do we find that the median South Korean 
respondent “agrees” that people should acquiesce to others socially, though healthy minorities disagree. 
 
 
Conceptualizing and Measuring African Values 
Four developments are widely seen as formative and dominant influences on the values that characterize 
African cultures.  First, until relatively recently, Africans have traditionally lived in small-scale villages.  
Second, again, until relatively recently, Africans have governed themselves through a usually patriarchal 
system of largely hereditary, unelected traditional leaders that, at the same time, reputedly featured 
significant amounts of inclusive participation in village council discussions.  Third, political rule was 
rarely exercised on the scale of the modern state, often extending only to the boundaries of the village, 
and beyond that only indirectly in loose confederation with other villages sharing tribal, clan or linguistic 
similarities.  Fourth, Africa’s modern political topography often bears little resemblance to the continent’s 
ethnic or tribal makeup as colonial mapmakers divided and recombined Africa’s homogenous agrarian 
and herding communities into heterogeneous national societies. 
 
The small scale nature of village life has meant that Africans, like Asians, begin from the premise of a 
society in which all people are interconnected in some way.  And, again echoing Asian traditional values, 
Africans tend to emphasize the communal good over individual destiny as communicated through the 
concept of ubuntu, which is interpreted to mean “I am human only through others” 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ubuntu). The relatively recent and often still limited influences of 
industrialization and the modern nation-state have led many to conclude that Africans continue to identify 
themselves according to where they live or the kinship group to which they belong, rather than by what 
they do or the broader polity in which they have been incorporated by colonial mapmakers.  And such 
kinship identities have been broadly seen to be so strong as to resist post-independence leaders’ attempts 
to construct new overarching identities. 
 
These values are seen to conflict with the values necessary for a democratic society in several ways.  
First, the emphasis on communal good means that producing just outcomes, even if it requires the use of 
violence, may be valued more than procedure and rule of law.  Second, the emphasis on the communal 
good and the history of traditional rule is said to lead people to think and act as clients dependant on 
patrimonial relations, and later on neo-patrimonial “big men,” to provide for their welfare (Bratton and 
van de Walle, 1997) or as passive, deferential subjects of external forces rather than as agents, or 
democratic citizens, with some degree of control over their lives or the wider polity (Chazan, 1993; 
Mamdani, 1996; Etounga-Manguelle, 2000).  Third, the patriarchal nature of many African polities means 
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that women are often seen as inferior and unequal.  Fourth, the emphasis on consensus may breed 
intolerance of dissent (Owusu, 1992).  Fifth, people with strong group-based identities may be more 
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likely to develop antipathies to “others” and less likely to accept a democracy that necessarily includes 
competing groups (Gibson and Gouws, 2003).  And last, because democracy presumes at least some prior 
agreement on the identity of the political community that is to govern itself (Rustow, 1970), the lack of 
national identity may deny young democracies of necessary “political glue,” turning every element of 
political contestation into a zero-sum, group-based conflict (Connor, 1987; Horowitz, 1985).  
 
We identified a range of question items from the Round 2 South Africa Afrobarometer questionnaire that 
appear to tap orientations to the role of authority, responsibility for providing welfare, community versus 
individual interest, violence, interpersonal trust, social identity, national identity and gender.  Because 
such cultural values are reputed to be embedded in traditional society and passed down from generation to 
generation, we excluded white Afrikaans and English speaking respondents from our analysis.  However, 
along with respondents who speak African languages we decided to include Coloured respondents (who 
either trace their roots to the Khoi-Khoi and San tribes of southern Africa or to the traditional societies of 
17th and 18th century Indonesia and Malaysia) and Indian respondents (who trace their lineage to the 19th 
century traditional societies of South Central Asia). 
 
We find that South Africans’ responses to a large number of these items cohere sufficiently to create one 
general index of what we interpret to measure Communitarian Values (which combines measures of the 
role of women, violence, clientelism and authority).  We also find that South Africans’ answers to a set of 
items on national identity fall into two distinct, though related, coherent patterns.  We interpret the first to 
measure a sense of Personal National Identity and the second to measure a sense of an Inclusive National 
Identity (in the African context, the opposite end of both these indices would constitute the purportedly 
traditional value, but we can think of no concise term adequate to characterize the opposite of both of 
these concepts).  Seven other items either fail to correlate with any of these indices sufficiently or 
amongst each other, but are retained as potential single item indicators.  On their face, we interpret them 
as measures of: 1) Traditional Social Identities; 2) Social Harmony; 3) Paternalism; 4) Subject Reliance 
on the State; 5) Consensualism; 6) Educational Elitism; and 7) Community Interest.  
 
If Koreans tend to “disagree” with much of what are said to be core Asian values, the average black 
(African, Coloured and Indian) South African “disagrees” with all, and “strongly disagrees” with several 
items on the Communitarian scale.  Black South Africans also exhibit extremely high levels of both 
Personal and Inclusive National Identity.  There are a few items, however, on which most South Africans 
adopt a more classically traditionalist viewpoint.  The median respondent “agrees” that it is important to 
minimize inequalities in wealth in order to avoid jealousy and conflict, that government should take care 
of people like a parent, and that debate should be extended to induce consensus rather than accepting 
differences of opinion.  Yet the average respondent disagrees with putting the community interest ahead 
of the individual interest and does not think that government should bear the main responsibility for 
providing welfare. 
 
 
Linking Cultural Values and Popular Demand for Democracy 
While the comparative study of popular attitudes to democracy has taken significant strides over the past 
decade, important debates about what to measure and how to measure it still exemplify the discipline, if 
implicitly.  One tradition has focused on measuring the degree to which people hold a range of democratic 
values (Almond and Verba, 1963; Inkeles and Smith, 1974; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). A separate 
tradition has concentrated on measuring popular support for democracy, but has disagreed on the 
appropriate indicators.  In the World Values Survey, popular support for democracy is measured by 
agreement or disagreement with a series of positive and negative statements about democracy.  Other 
have chosen to force respondents to make choices between democracy and its alternatives (Linz and 
Stepan, 1996; Lagos, 2001) or to ask people about a series of non-democratic regimes with which they 
may have some experience (Rose, et al., 1998).  Yet others prefer to eschew the word “democracy” 
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altogether, but rather assess people’s attitudes by asking whether they agree or disagree with statements 
about a range of democratic processes identified by the scholar as essential to democracy (Gibson, 1996). 
 
In this article, we adopt a different approach.  Following Bratton, et al.’s (2004) demand and supply 
model of democratic consolidation, we measure two separate sets of democratic attitudes.  The first is 
premised on Linz and Stepan’s (1996) view of democratic consolidation as legitimation, i.e., when 
democracy comes to be viewed as “the only game in town.”  We measure this with a scale that combines 
Richard Rose’s measures of rejection of authoritarianism with the Linz and Stepan item on preference for 
democracy against its alternatives.  We premise our measures of the second set of attitudes on the 
institutional view of democratic consolidation (Huntington, 1996; Hadenius, 2001; Grindle, 2000, 
Fukuyama, 2005).  But rather than using expert assessments of institutional delivery, we ask respondents 
whether they think their political institutions are actually delivering democracy.  Fortunately, the East 
Asia and Afrobarometer surveys contain nearly identical items that allow us to construct almost identical 
dependent variables (the measures of demand for democracy are identical, but there are some differences 
in the measurement of supply). 
 
Bratton, et al. (2004) argue that young democracies become consolidated – meaning there is little or no 
chance of breakdown or regression (Schedler, 2001) – when relatively high proportions of citizens 
continue, over several different measurements, to both demand democracy and to feel that their new 
political institutions are actually delivering it.  To what extent do South Koreans and South Africans 
demand democracy, and do they feel that it is being supplied by their regime? 
 
Between eight and nine out of every ten South Koreans disagree or strongly disagree with proposals to 
replace their current system of multiparty elections with presidential dictatorship, military rule or one 
party rule.  These figures have held steady since at least 1997.  Yet just 49 percent say that “democracy is 
always preferable” to an authoritarian regime, which represents a new low point, down considerably from 
the 70 percent who said so in 1996. 
 
Figure 1: Demand for Democracy over Time, South Korea 
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To measure South Koreans’ perceptions of the institutional supply of democracy, the 2003 East Asia 
Barometer presented respondents with a 10 point scale, with endpoints of complete dictatorship (1) and 
complete democracy (10), and asked them to place South Korea according to its current level of 
democracy.  When asked in this way, 82 percent placed South Korea as more democratic than 
undemocratic (a score of 6 or above), and 20 percent rated it as highly democratic (between 8 and 10).  In 
the other question that makes up the Supply Index, 60 percent said they were satisfied with the way 
democracy was currently working in South Korea, though just 1 percent said they were “very satisfied.” 
 
Figure 2: Supply of Democracy over Time, South Korea 
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democracy with minor problems,” and just 46 percent said that they were “satisfied” or “very satisfied” 
ith the way democracy was working in the country. 
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Figure 3: Demand for Democracy over Time, South Africa 
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If traditional values constitute the obstacle to democratization in the developing world as portrayed in the 
arguments reviewed earlier, traditionalists in both Asia and Africa should be less likely to demand 
democracy than other respondents.  Yet traditionalists should also be more likely to feel that their political 
institutions are supplying democracy.  This may seem counterintuitive at first; why would someone who 
does not prefer democracy be more likely to think they are receiving it?  We argue that in democratizing 
contexts, like Korea and South Africa, if traditionalists really are passive, acquiescent followers, they will 
be more likely to consider that their governments – which call themselves democratic – are indeed 
delivering democracy and less likely to think critically about the content of regime performance. 
 
As a first test of these hypotheses, we examine the bivariate correlations between the various multi-item 
and single-item indicators of traditional values (which differ for the two countries) and the measures of 
demand for and supply of democracy (which are nearly identical for both) that we have constructed from 
the South Korean and South African responses.  The results suggest potentially strong evidence for the  
traditional values thesis, especially in South Korea.  They show that South Koreans who respect authority, 
feel that they would lose face working under a woman, and respect family and elders, are in fact much 
less likely to demand democracy.  In addition, those who believe that wealth and success are determined 
by fate, who emphasize social harmony, and who do not trust other citizens are also less likely to demand 
democracy, though to a lesser extent.  However, those who value deference and accommodation to others 
do not differ from others in any significant way in their preference for democracy. 
 
Table 5: Cultural Values and Demand and Supply of Democracy I (Bivariate Correlations), South 
Korea 
 Demand for  Democracy Supply of Democracy 
Respect for Authority    -.314***     .149*** 
Chauvinism     -.224*** .035 
Respect for Family and Elders      -.198***    . 114*** 
Fatalism    -.161***  .063* 
Emphasize Societal Harmony    -.160***     .128*** 
Educational Elitism    -.126*** .023 
Interpersonal Trust      .086***       .118*** 
Deference / Accomodation .013   .061* 
 
Alternatively, traditionalist South Koreans are, as predicted, more likely be believe they are being 
supplied with democracy, though the impact is more modest and less consistent.  Those who value respect 
for authority and for family and elders, and those who value societal harmony, are more likely to feel that 
their institutions are delivering democracy than other South Koreans. 
 
Table 6: Cultural Values and Demand and Supply of Democracy II (OLS), South Korea 
 Demand for  Democracy Supply of Democracy 
Respect for Authority    -.346*** .121*** 
Chauvinism    
Respect for Family and Elders      -.185****  
Fatalism -.101**  
Emphasize Societal Harmony  .093*** 
Educational Elitism  -.144***  
Interpersonal Trust     .104*** .097*** 
Deference / Accommodation    .079***  
   
Adjusted R2 .231 .041 
N 1481 1489 
Standardized Regression Coefficients (Beta) 
Variables with p> .05 dropped from final model 
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Thus, we find at least initial support for both of our hypotheses.  Traditionalists are less likely to want 
democracy, yet they are simultaneously less likely to exercise their critical faculties on the performance of 
the political regime, perhaps due to their desire to respect authority and not rock the societal boat.  When 
we regress our two dependent variables on this battery of traditional cultural values, they account for a 
substantial 23 percent of the variance in South Koreans’ demand for democracy, but just 4 percent of the 
variance in perceived supply. 
 
The South African results are consistent with the South Korean findings with respect to demand for 
Democracy, though the magnitudes of the associations are lower.  Black South Africans who hold 
traditional communitarian values (value patriarchy, see themselves as clients, and want to retain a resort 
to violence), think only the educated should vote, and have a weak sense of South African national 
identity are indeed less likely to demand democracy. 
 
Table 7: Cultural Values and Demand and Supply of Democracy I (Bivariate Correlations), South 
Africa 
 Demand for Democracy Supply of Democracy 
Communitarian Values      -.312***     -.108*** 
Educational Elitism     -.150***    -.080** 
Inclusive National Identity         .187***        .212*** 
Personal National Identity        .195***        .233*** 
Paternalism     -.075**  .001 
Dependency  -.007 -.023 
Consensualism    -.052*       .067** 
Traditional Social Identities  .029 -.036 
Societal Harmony     .050* -.042 
Community Interest -.023         .078*** 
Bivariate Correlations (Pairwise Deletion of Missing Values) 
Black Respondents Only 
 
Table 8: Cultural Values and Demand and Supply of Democracy II (OLS), South Africa 
  Demand for Democracy Supply of Democracy 
Communitarian Values -.284***  -.077** 
Educational Elitism -.096***  
Inclusive National Identity       .166*** 
Personal National Identity   .087* 
Paternalism -.080***  
Dependency   
Consensualism   
Traditional Social Identity    
Societal Harmony  -.060* 
Community Interest      .074** 
   
Adjusted R2 .111 .070 
N 1249 1274 
Standardized Regression Coefficients (Beta) 
All variables p> .05 excluded 
Black Respondents Only 
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However, the impact on the perceived supply of democracy differs quite sharply from South Korea.  In 
South Africa, those who possess strong personal and inclusive national identities (which in Africa is seen 
as the modernist position) are more likely to think they are being supplied with democracy, not less.  And 
those who score highly on our communitarianism scale are more critical of the supply of democracy, not 
less.  Only those who value consensual decision-making and elevate the community interest over the 
individual are more likely to say they are living in a democracy, though the impact is quite limited.  
Taken together, cultural factors account for approximately 11 percent of the variance in South Africans’ 
demand for democracy, and 7 percent of the perceived supply. 
 
 
Cultural Values Versus Other Competing Theoretical Explanations of Attitudes to Democracy 
Thus far, we have assessed the direct links between traditional cultural values and key attitudes to 
democracy in both countries.  What remains to be tested, however, is whether these links remain once we 
take into account a range of other respondent evaluations and characteristics.  In other words, are the 
impacts of traditional values we have reviewed above independent of other factors, or will they diminish 
and even disappear once we test the simultaneous impact of other theoretical families of factors? 
 
Table 9: Demand for Democracy1, Explanatory Factors Compared2, South Korea 
 r b S.E. Beta Adj. 
R2 
(block) 
Adj. 
R2 
(cumul.) 
Constant  1..609 .102    
       
Cultural Values     .232 .232 
     Respect for Authority -.401 -.361 .027 -.319***   
     Respect for Family / Elders -.253 -.111 .020 -.133***   
     Educational Elitism -.143 -.074 .013 -.126***   
     Patriarchy -.254 -.052 .014 -.086***   
     Interpersonal Trust  .093  .069 .022  .071**   
       
Performance Evaluations     .101 .282 
     Trusts Representative Institutions -.197 -.104 .020 -.127***   
     Democracy Able To Solve Problems .210 .129 .124 .123***   
     Increased Freedoms Under 
Democracy 
.099 .087 .019 .104***   
     Perceives Corruption in Government -.072 -.056 .019 -.071**   
     Personal Experience With Corruption -.117 -.057 .019 -.066**   
       
Cognitive Awareness     .032 .292 
      Feels Able to Participate in Politics -.105 -.049 .014 -.075***   
      Feels Able to Understand Politics .140 .039 .014 .065***   
      Persuaded Others During Campaign .041 .079 .029 .062***   
       
Institutional Influences       
     Trusts Civil Society Organizations  .059 .083 .021 .094*** .002 .300 
       
       
Full Model   .394   .300 
** p =/<.01   *** p=/<.001 
N = 1,476 
1.  The dependent variable is the index of commitment to democracy (an average score composed of expressed 
support for democracy plus rejection of military, one-party, and one-man rule). 
2.  Ordinary least squares regression estimates. 
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Following the theoretical framework of competing explanations of public attitudes laid out in Bratton, et 
al. (2004), we have identified a wide range of conceptually similar items in the East Asia and 
Afrobarometer questionnaires and grouped them according to whether they measured: 1) Performance 
Evaluations of the government’s record in delivering economic and political goods; 2) Institutional 
Influences such as identifying with a political party or membership in a civil society organization; 3) 
Cognitive Awareness of politics such as news media use or political interest and discussion; or finally 4) 
one’s position in the Social Structure, such as rural or urban residence, income or occupation.  We then 
tested whether the statistical explanatory power of cultural values remained stable, or was reduced once 
we brought indicators of these other competing theoretical families into the equation. 
 
Table 10: Supply of Democracy1, Explanatory Factors Compared2, South Korea 
 r b S.E. Beta Adj. 
R2 
(block) 
Adj. 
R2 
(cumul.) 
Constant       
       
Performance Evaluations     .185 .185 
    Satisfaction With Govt Performance .328 .259 .030 .217***   
    Perceives Corruption in Government -.286 -.250 .033 -.189***   
    Perceives Freedom of Speech and 
    Association 
.183 .114 .024 .120***   
    Increased Freedoms Under 
Democracy 
.197 .101 .035 .073**   
   Government Enforces Law Fairly -.102 .091 .034 -.063***   
       
Cultural Values     .025 .203 
     Emphasizes Social Harmony .143 .143 .042 .082***   
     Fatalism .078 .079 .023 .081***   
       
Institutional Influences     .018 .211 
    Contacts Formal Leaders -.136 -.385 .093 -.096***   
       
Social Structure     .011 .215 
      Lives in Urban Area -.108 -.079 .027 -.070***   
       
       
Full Model    .696  .215 
** p =/<.01   *** p=/<.001 
N = 1,481 
1.  The dependent variable is the index of supply of democracy (an average score composed of perceived extent of 
democracy plus satisfaction with democracy). 
2.  Ordinary least squares regression estimates.  
 
First of all, we find that adding these families of variables into the equation allows us to construct 
relatively powerful models of democratic attitudes in both countries.  It should be noted that we estimated 
these models conservatively: by excluding all variables that were not significantly related to the 
dependent variables (at p<.01), we chose parsimony over a high R2 figure.  We can account for 30 percent 
of the variance in demand, and 22 percent in the perceived supply in South Korea, and 27 percent of 
demand and 30 percent of perceived supply in South Africa.  However, a full discussion of the theoretical 
implications of these findings is beyond the scope of this paper.  What we are currently interested in is 
what happens to the impact of cultural values once we test other theories of attitudes toward democracy 
beyond that of political culture. 
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Table 11: Demand for Democracy1, Explanatory Factors Compared2, South Africa 
 r b S.E. Beta Adj. 
R2 
(block) 
Adj. 
R2 
(cumul.) 
Constant       
       
Performance Evaluations     .131 .131 
     Increased Freedom Under 
Democracy 
.328 .135 .023 .211***   
     Perceives Corruption in Government .063 .136 .023 .175***   
     State Is Able To Enforce Law .283 ..048 .013 .113***   
     Ease of Access To State .188 .060 .020 .094**   
       
Cultural Values     .106 .220 
     Communitarianism -.347 -.187 .036 -.173***   
     Educational Elitism -.190 -.058 .016 -.111***   
       
Cognitive Awareness     .069 .232 
      Cognitive Engagement  .233 .059 .017 .105***   
       
Social Structure     .016 .268 
     Urban .171 .166 .030 .166***   
     Ill Health -.110 -.065 .018 -.101***   
       
       
Full Model   .426   .268 
** p =/<.01   *** p=/<.001 
N = 908 
1.  The dependent variable is the index of commitment to democracy (an average score composed of expressed 
support for democracy plus rejection of military, one-party, and one-man rule). 
2.  Ordinary least squares regression estimates. 
 
As we saw in Table 6, the entire package of traditional values by themselves explained 23 percent of the 
variance in demand for democracy in South Korea; adding in the other sets of variables simultaneously 
allows us to explain 30 percent.  Yet the unique contribution of cultural values within the final model 
remains at exactly 23 percent.  Thus, cultural values comprise the most important part of a model of 
demand for democracy in South Korea, and the single largest impact comes from the Respect for 
Authority variable (Beta =-.319).  This also suggests that any additional explanatory contribution of 
Performance Evaluations, Cognitive Awareness, and Institutional Influences is independent of the impact 
of culture in South Korea.  Second, the impact of traditional values remains consistently negative.  Those 
South Koreans who hold the traditionalist position on measures of respect for authority, respect for family 
and elders, educational elitism, patriarchy and interpersonal (dis)trust are less likely to say democracy is 
preferable, or to strongly reject authoritarian alternatives. 
 
Also in Table 6, we saw that while traditional values played a much smaller role in shaping how South 
Koreans evaluated the institutional supply of democracy, the direction of the impact was still positive.   
 
Examining the full model of supply, we can now see that the impact of culture has been reduced 
substantially (from 4 percent by itself, to 2.5 percent).  Performance evaluations are a much more 
powerful determinant of whether Koreans think they are living in a democracy and whether they are 
satisfied with the way democracy works.  However, the direction of the impact of values, as small as it is, 
remains positive.  Those Koreans who value societal harmony and have a fatalist view of success and 
failure in life, are more likely to think their institutions are supplying democracy.  This confirms our 
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suspicion that traditionalists (all other things being equal) are less likely to apply a critical lens in 
evaluating government and regime performance than modernists. 
 
Table 12: Supply of Democracy1, Explanatory Factors Compared2, South Africa 
 R b S.E. Beta Adj. 
R2 
(block) 
Adj. 
R2 
(cumul.) 
Constant       
       
Performance Evaluations     .290 .290 
     Approval of Incumbent Performance  .416 .237 .026 .211***   
     Quality of Life Improved Under 
     Democracy 
.388 .206 .032 .149***   
     Approves of Govt Policy 
Performance 
     In Basic Services  
.341 .142 .023 .135***   
     Approves of Govt Policy 
Performance 
     In Macro Economy 
.375 .173 .032 .128***   
     Quality of Governance Improved 
     Under Democracy 
.315 .132 .029 .100***   
     Ease of Access to State .264 .123 .031 .085***   
       
Cultural Values     .005 .286 
     Community Interest .078 .063 .024 -.053**   
       
Social Structure     .013 .303 
     Coloured .016 .198 .067 .060**   
     Ill Health -.084 -.077 .028 -.055**   
       
       
Full Model      .303 
** p =/<.01   *** p=/<.001 
N = 1792 
1.  The dependent variable is the index of supply of democracy (an average score composed of perceived extent of 
democracy plus satisfaction with democracy). 
2.  Ordinary least squares regression estimates. 
 
The impact of traditional values among black South Africans also remains an important predictor of 
demand for democracy, even after we control for the impact of a range of other factors like cognition, 
social structure, institutional membership and performance satisfaction.  Performance evaluations are the 
most important predictor of demand for democracy, but cultural values add approximately 9 additional 
percentage points to the power of the model.  And the direction of the impact is as predicted.  Those who 
hold communitarian values are less likely to prefer democracy or reject authoritarian alternatives. 
Finally, while Table 8 suggested that traditional values, on their own, could account for 7 percent of the 
variance in the perceived supply of democracy, that impact is almost totally taken over by the effect of 
performance evaluations.  While we can account for 30 percent of the variance in perceptions of 
democratic supply among black South Africans, cultural values account for less than one percent.  But, 
against our expectations, the direction of the impact, while very small, is negative.  In other words, those 
black South Africans who hold traditional values are not only less likely to demand democracy, but they 
are also less likely to think they are getting it. 
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Conclusions 
In this paper, we have demonstrated that traditional cultural values do shape popular attitudes to 
democracy in Asia and Africa, even in relatively modernized settings like South Africa.  However, it is 
important to remember that the descriptive statistics reviewed in Tables 1 and 2 demonstrated clearly that 
traditionalists are minorities within both societies.  However, those minorities, other things being equal, 
are substantially less likely both to prefer democracy to its alternatives, and to reject non-democratic 
alternatives to their current regimes. 
 
We end with two final considerations.  First, the findings we have just reported stand in contrast to initial 
probes in Asia (Dalton and Ong, 2004) and Africa (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).  We also 
found a much stronger impact than initial investigations in South Korea (Park and Shin, 2004).  What 
explains this?  Part of this may be methodological.  As for South Africa, Bratton, et al. (2004) reported 
findings from a pooled data set of Afrobarometer Round 1 surveys in 12 countries.  South Africa could 
have been quite different from the other 11 countries if the model had been tested by country.  At the 
same time, the present results are based on Round 2 of the Afrobarometer whose questionnaire may have 
contained an improved set of measures of values compared to those available from Round 1.  In the case 
of South Korea, part of the reason may be that the East Asia Barometer designers did a much better job of 
anticipating and measuring Asia-specific value structures than could have been achieved by the global 
World Values Survey data on which Dalton and Ong (2004) based their analysis.  Another fact could be 
that the Barometer measures of attitudes to democracy, particularly the indicators of demand, do a much 
better job of discriminating between democrats and non-democrats than the World Values Survey 
indicators, which tend to yield overly optimistic assessments of global support for democracy (see, for 
example, Inglehart, 2003). 
 
Second, we have found a much stronger impact of cultural values in South Korea than South Africa.  
Why?  A first reason might be located in the diverging history of the respective countries, both in the 
short and the long term.  In terms of recent history, it might be that public support for democracy in South 
Korea was initially based on a Churchillian assessment that it was better than the old dictatorship in 
delivering key political goods like freedom and rights.  But because the dictatorship had been able to 
deliver other desired public goods like economic growth and social order, the ancien regime was never 
fully discredited in the public mind (Chu, 2003a).  Thus, as the new regime has struggled to root out 
corruption or deal with the Asian economic crisis, basic values have become the prime line of distinction 
between democrats and non-democrats, rather than positive relative assessments of democracy compared 
to its predecessor.  In South Africa, however, the apartheid regime still serves to legitimate the new 
regime, if only through its thoroughly negative memory. 
 
In terms of deep history, because the experience of colonialism was far more prolonged and intense in 
Africa than in Asia, traditional values may have remained more intact and retain a more meaningful 
connection with one’s views toward modern representative democracy in South Korea.  And while we 
certainly disagree with romantic celebrations of the democratic nature of pre-colonial traditional rule in 
Africa,  we do agree that traditional African politics featured important elements of democratic 
participation that may make African traditionalists more open to modern democracy than their Asian 
counterparts. 
 
But a second reason may have to do with methodology.  From our attempts to create meaningful, reliable 
and valid multi-item indicators of these values, it is evident that the East Asia Barometer offers better 
measures than the Afrobarometer.  However, we feel the broader contribution of our findings is the 
demonstration that cultural values do matter for the things in which the Asia and Afrobarometers are 
ultimately interested, and that both projects need to develop better composite measures of cultural values, 
traditional or otherwise. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i  The World Values Study provides extensive data from standardized questions on national publics around the 
world, including many developing societies.  However, this strength may also be one of its drawbacks.  A 
questionnaire originally developed in North American and Western European contexts may not provide local 
scholars with the necessary data to examine the existence of value structures derived from specific cultures. 
ii  Family authority orientations were measured by the following items: 
 Respect parents 
 Parents duty 
 Make parents proud 
The societal authority orientations were measured by the following items: 
 Teach obedience 
 Work to instructions 
 Respect authority 
iii  The Democratic Regime Index consisted of the following items: 
Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections (Fairly Bad / Very Bad) 
Having experts, not government, make decision according to what they think is best for the country (Fairly Bad 
/ Very Bad) 
Having the army rule (Fairly Bad / Very Bad) 
Having a democratic political system (Fairly Good / Very Good)  
iv  The “family-state” concept suggests that to Asians there is an analogy between the family and the state, while the 
“moral state” concept suggests that they see the state as endowed with moral authority.  “Anti-adversarial politics” 
refers to a perceived Asian aversion to conflict and adversarial opposition. 
v  The three items measuring Democratic Support are: 
Here is a scale: 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy.  To what extent would you 
want the country to be democratic now? 
Here is a similar scale of 1 to 10 measuring the extent to which people think democracy is suitable for our 
country.  If “1” means that democracy is completely unsuitable for South Korea today and “10” means that 
is completely suitable, where would you place our country today? 
Which of the following comes closest to your own opinion.?  
 - Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government 
- Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a  
democratic one. 
- For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non  
democratic regime. 
vi  The three items measuring Rejection of Authoritarianism are: 
As you know, there are some people in our country who would like to change the way in which our country is 
governed.  We would like to know whether you think of their views.  Fore each statement, would you say 
you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree? 
We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things 
The military should come in to govern the country 
We should get rid of parliament and elections and have the experts decide everything. 
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